The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American Jurisprudence by Clark, Kayla
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 8
5-10-2018
The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law
and American Jurisprudence
Kayla Clark
University of Notre Dame Law School, kaylaannclark@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, Kayla (2018) "The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American Jurisprudence," Notre Dame Journal of
International & Comparative Law: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl/vol8/iss2/8
The Paris Agreement: Its Role in International Law and American
Jurisprudence
Cover Page Footnote
Kayla Clark, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2018.I would like to thank Notre Dame Law Professor Mary
Ellen O’Connell
This note is available in Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl/vol8/iss2/8
THE PARIS AGREEMENT: ITS ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 




INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 107 
I. LOOKING TO THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE FOR SUCCESS ................... 109 
A. HISTORY ................................................................................................. 109 
B. TRANSITION FROM KYOTO TO PARIS ........................................................ 112 
C. THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS ................................ 115 
II. LEGALITY OF THE UNITED STATES’ COMMITMENT TO AND POTENTIAL 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT ................................................ 118 
A. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 2016 COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY ...................... 118 
B. PRESIDENT TRUMP WITHDRAWS .............................................................. 122 
C. LEGALITY OF WITHDRAWAL ..................................................................... 123 





On December 12, 2015, the international community created the first major 
climate change agreement since 1997: The Paris Agreement.1 The goals of the 
treaty are unprecedented, and the document features an innovative oversight 
strategy to enforce its ambitious scope. The historical nature of the Agreement 
is clear not only from the sheer participation in the treaty—with over 196 
participating countries2—but also because the content of this agreement has 
radically advanced the use of international law to combat climate change.3 
When the United States joined China and India in ratifying the Paris 
Agreement, the treaty became the first international climate change agreement 
to have all three of the world’s greatest polluters actively involved.4 After nearly 
two decades under the unsupported Kyoto Protocol regime, China, India, and 
the United States’ support for the Paris Agreement signaled a shift in global 
consciousness about climate change and a substantial development in 
 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Notre Dame, Class of 2018. I would like to thank Notre Dame 
Law Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell. 
1 See generally Robert Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate 
Politics, 92 INT’L AFF. 1107 (2016).  
2 Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).  
3 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1112–13. 
4 Participation by the world’s greatest polluters is widely thought to be necessary to the success of 
the Paris Agreement. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Paris Agreement 
(Oct. 5, 2016) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/10/05/remarks-president-paris-agreement); see also DANIEL BODANSKY, CTR. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY SOLS., LEGAL OPTIONS FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A NEW CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 
SOLUTIONS 1 (2015), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/05/legal-options-us-acceptance-
new-climate-change-agreement.pdf (“Unless the Paris outcome applies to the world’s biggest emitters, it 
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international commitment to combat greenhouse gas emissions.5 Shortly after 
the United States’ ratification, the Paris Agreement met the requirements 
necessary for it to become legally binding and viable—ratification from fifty-
five countries, accounting for fifty-five percent of global emissions.6 Law, for 
the first time since the Kyoto negotiations, seemed to be the best possible 
mechanism to achieve change, and for the first time in decades, hope seemed to 
replace stalemate as the dominate culture of international climate change effort. 
However, this hope was short lived. On November 9, 2016, Republican nominee 
Donald Trump, a candidate committed to renege on any U.S. participation in the 
recently enacted Paris Agreement,7 won the American presidency. 
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the United States 
would withdraw from the Paris Agreement.8 In the wake of his announcement, 
we unavoidably find ourselves in a most critical moment for the future of 
international and environmental law—and their role in American jurisprudence. 
The world is now pulled between Paris’ new legal framework and the movement 
that supports it, and the uncooperative leadership in one of the Agreement’s key 
parties. Despite the Paris Agreement’s significant support, domestic politics in 
one of the most influential countries in the world has the potential to uproot and 
gut any meaningful impact of the pact. Recent evidence, namely the Kyoto 
Protocol, warns of the United States’ power to subvert global environmental 
efforts. Moreover, the United States’ diplomatic status and relationship to 
international law hangs in the balance. 
In such a determinative moment, this note seeks to answer two questions. 
First, after reflecting on prior climate change treaties, what promise does the 
Paris Agreement, as a tool of international law, offer for the future of 
international climate change efforts? In the wake of the expired Kyoto Protocol 
regime, the international community had the opportunity to learn many lessons; 
of critical importance is whether the Paris Agreement’s goals and structure seem 
to have contemplated prior treaty failures. In other words, this note first asks 
whether the Paris Agreement as a treaty will be an effective expression of 
international law. Second, despite the ambition and structure of the Paris 
Agreement, and its potential to be an effective treaty regime, how does the 
Trump administration’s announcement to withdrawal affect the treaty and the 
legal obligations of involved countries? Specifically, is it possible for the Paris 
Agreement to be successful without the support of, or potentially despite active 
antagonism by, the United States? Additionally, now that the Paris Agreement 
has entered into force, what are the legal consequences for the United States now 
that President Trump has reneged the United States’ commitment to the treaty? 
In analyzing the structure and enforcement mechanisms of the Paris Agreement, 
 
 
5 Rebecca Hersher, India Ratifies Paris Climate Change Agreement, NPR (Oct. 2, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/02/496305658/india-ratifies-paris-climate-change-
agreement.  
6 Coral Davenport, U.N. Signals That Climate Deal Has Backing Needed to Enter Force, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2pnJ379 (explaining that in reaching the treaties requirements for both 
number of ratifying parties and percentage of emissions accounted for, the climate deal will become 
legally enforceable against all signing parties).  
7 See Matt McGrath, Donald Trump Would ‘Cancel’ Paris Climate Deal, BBC (May 27, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36401174.  
8 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 
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this note determines what legal obligations the United States incurred through 
President Barrack Obama’s lawful ratification, examining whether the United 
States will have liability if the Trump Administration chooses not to comply 
with the terms of the treaty, and what legal impact may be caused by rescinding 
the treaty—both for the Paris Agreement and future U.S. involvement in 
international law. 
 




The Paris Agreement, as the most recent major international environmental 
treaty, presents a unique vantage point from which to view past efforts to address 
climate change. The successes, failures, and permutations of climate change 
policies over time illuminate the strengths and potential areas of concern for the 
Paris Agreement. In this section, I discuss the legal forces that lead to the 
development of climate change treaty regimes, and how the evolution of these 
forces has made the Paris Agreement a promising new approach to climate 
change and international law.  
Prior to the Kyoto Protocol’s adoption in 1997, international environmental 
agreements focused on reactionary approaches to issues such as ozone depletion, 
water pollution, and waste disposal.9 However, in the lead-up to the Protocol, 
policymakers and the scientific community attempted to create the first 
ambitious international legal effort to proactively address greenhouse gas 
emissions. Unfortunately, the reality of the Protocol—both as a substantive and 
structural solution to the scientific evidence—has been well recognized as a 
failure.10  
Several specific design flaws of the Protocol help explain why international 
law’s first true attempt at climate change policy failed, and assist policymakers 
form accurate expectations about the viability of the Paris Agreement.11 The 
Kyoto Protocol’s failure has been problematized by author Amanda Rosen, 
using her systematic framework for policy analysis. The three-part framework 
evaluates a policy’s effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance.12 Application of 
the framework shows that the Kyoto Protocol failed all three benchmarks.13 The 
design flaws of the treaty led to a lack of participation by certain states whose 
emissions were critical to any meaningful improvement in the climate.14 The 
 
 
9 See generally Guus J. M. Velders et al., The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting 
Climate, 104 PNAS 4814 (2007) (discussing how the Montreal Protocol, an international response to the 
issue of ozone depletion, was a wide-reaching and formidable international environmental treaty prior to 
the Kyoto Protocol). In addition to successful ozone rehabilitation efforts, the Montreal Protocol’s scope 
also included climate change protections and laid groundwork for the Kyoto Protocol.  
10 Alexandre Durand, Common Responsibility: The Failure of Kyoto, 34 HARV. INT’L REV. 8, 8–9 
(2012). 
11 Amanda M. Rosen, The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change, 43 POL. & POL’Y 30, 44 (2015). 
12 Id. at 34 (citing Jennifer Wallner, Legitimacy and Public Policy: Seeing Beyond Effectiveness, 
Efficiency, and Performance, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 421 (2008). 
13 Id. at 35–40.  
14 BODANSKY, supra note 4, at 1 (explaining that “[a] major weakness of the Kyoto Protocol has been 
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absence of key players—such as China, India, and the United States—
compounded with the failure of signatory states to adhere to the pact, made it an 
ineffective and inefficient treaty regime.15 Finally, because of the flawed 
differentiation between states, compliance by ratifying parties was weak.16 
Most devastating to its effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance was the 
Kyoto Protocol’s top-down approach to coerce states with mandatory 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. These mandatory targets created a 
legal liability, and were ineffective both as a mechanism for participating 
countries and nonparticipating countries.17 The main design feature of the targets 
was a differentiation between what were determined to be “Annex I” and “Non-
Annex I” states.18 This distinction created two classes of nations: those that were 
developed and capable of immediately reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
(“Annex I”), and those that were categorized as developing and thus deemed 
unable to immediately begin emissions reduction (“Non-Annex I”).19 The 
identification of two classes of states was influenced by the international law 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in which developed 
states were seen as more capable of reducing emissions and more responsible 
for the emissions given their historically industrial role.20 Additionally, 
developing states were believed to lack the necessary capacity to reduce their 
emissions, and perhaps were even justified in desiring to continue industrializing 
in an environmentally unsustainable way (i.e. industrialize “as they see fit”) 
because ecological standards were not enforced on countries that had 
industrialized over the last two centuries.21  
Because of the Annex design, the emissions targets created a participation 
deficit by some of the nations with highest emission rates, such as China and 
India.22 This was because Non-Annex I status, and thus freedom from emissions 
targets, was determined by each state’s level of development.23 
Correspondingly, it dramatically reduced the Protocol’s effectiveness by 
narrowing the scope of potential greenhouse gas emissions available to target.24 
 
 
protocol’s lack of new mitigation commitments for developing countries, which now account for the 
majority of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,” which can alternatively be described as a 
fundamental lack of coverage). 
15 Rosen, supra note 11, at 31. 
16 Id. at 35–36. 
17 Id. at 35 (“Experts have pointed out that even full participation and compliance with Kyoto would 
not have prevented wide spread climate change . . . . [H]owever, the 2007 report by the IPCC asserts, ‘the 
numerous mitigation measures that have been undertaken by many Parties to the UNFCCC . . . are 
inadequate for reversing overall GHG emission trends.’”) (citations omitted).  
18 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1111. 
19 See id.  
20 Durand, supra note 10, at 9; Falkner, supra note 1, at 1116. 
21 Durand, supra note 10, at 9 (“The concerned non-Annex I nations have replied that ecological 
standards set by the international community were not applied to countries that industrialized over the 
course of the last two centuries, and that they also have the right to industrialize as they see fit.”).  
22 Id. 
23 See Parties & Observers, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2018) (explaining the 
difference between Annex I, Annex II, and Non-Annex I parties).   
24 Jorge Vinuales, The Paris Climate Agreement: An Initial Examination (Part I of III), EJIL TALK! 
(Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-climate-agreement-an-initial-examination-part-i-of-ii/ 
(noting that the total “commitments [made] under the Kyoto Protocol cover[ed] not more than 14% of 
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Failing to assign emission reduction obligations to heavy polluters like China 
and India prevented the Protocol from capturing or reducing a large amount of 
global greenhouse gas emissions.  
This reality made joining the Protocol unattractive to developed countries 
that believed adhering to the Protocol would restrict domestic industry.25 One of 
the largest global polluters, the United States, choose not to join the Protocol 
because the targets were seen as both economically restrictive on domestic 
industry, and ineffective given the large amount of pollution left untouched in 
Non-Annex I countries.26 Without China and India, and later the United States, 
the treaty only accounted for thirty percent of global emissions.27 Thus, the 
cumulative effect of the Protocol’s Annex design made the treaty unambitious 
in both spirit and execution.  
Even for the countries that were not dissuaded by the Annex problems 
described above, the structural design of the treaty did not favor success for 
participating nations. Rosen writes that even once implemented, there were four 
design flaws that made the Kyoto Protocol work particularly poorly. Of the four 
design flaws, the two were particularly important: the short commitment period 
and the non-progressive emissions targets.28 The emissions targets that were 
assigned to participating Annex I countries were both unambitious and easily 
achieved within the short commitment period.29 This created a system in which 
the participating countries had very little incentive to make long-term 
investments in reductions targets because they could all too easily meet their 
obligations. The design of the Protocol’s emissions targets created a near-sighted 
vision for climate change, when ultimately long-term solutions were needed.30 
Similarly, Robert Falkner writes that the static emissions reduction target failed 
to create dynamic incentives to decarbonize economies. And, importantly, by 
anticipating renegotiation of emissions targets in a future treaty, the assignment 
of targets became “a distributional conflict over respective shares of the 
mitigation burden” of emissions reduction, instead of a vehicle for meaningful 
efforts against climate change.31  
Kyoto’s failure of inspiration includes an additional insidious effect on the 
attitude of environmentalists.32 Though the Kyoto Protocol may have been 
recognized as unsatisfactory and limited, environmentalists were still compelled 
to back it as it was the only international legal regime in existence and had not 
run its statutory course.33 Backing by those most concerned with environmental 
issues seems to have wasted many critical years, political capital, and a huge 
volume of potentially preventable emissions. This latent effect cautions future 
treaty-crafters against making self-defeating policy regimes that act as their own 
barrier to improvement.  
 
 
25 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1122 (“Time and again, major emitters have shown themselves willing to 
accept a loss in international reputation when domestic economic priorities have been at stake.”). 
26 See Durand, supra note 10, at 9. 
27 Id.; see also Vinuales, supra note 24.  
28 Rosen, supra note 11, at 40. 
29 Id. at 36, 40 (Rosen writes that the five-year commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol “promoted 
policies that focused on picking the low-hanging fruit rather than engaging in the fundamental economic 
and social changes necessary for a sincere effort at halting global climate change.”).  
30 Id. at 40–41. 
31 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1111. 
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In turning our attention to the Paris Agreement, there are many lessons from 
Kyoto to apply—primarily from the ineffective crafting of the past treaty. 
Luckily, the Paris Agreement shows that, despite the failure to renew the Kyoto 
Protocol, environmental issues have not permanently taken a back seat in the 
international law arena. Instead, the Paris Agreement may show that the 
international community legitimately rebuked the shortcomings of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s top-down, differentiation approach, and have instead put a concerted 
effort into using international law with a fundamentally different strategy to 
address climate change. 
 
B. TRANSITION FROM KYOTO TO PARIS 
 
After the crumbling of the Kyoto Protocol, the international community 
went without another major environmental treaty until the Paris Agreement. In 
the short time since the treaty’s completion, over 197 parties have joined the 
pact. Most strikingly, there are also 127 ratified parties to the Agreement.34 In 
total, it took less than a year from the Agreement’s adoption date (December 12, 
2015) for it to reach the ratification threshold needed to enter into force. The 
Kyoto Protocol, by comparison, only yielded eighty-three ratifying parties, and 
it took eight years for it to enter into force.35 Looking beyond environmental 
treaties, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court garnered 124 
ratifying parties, and entered into force in July of 2002, nearly four years after 
initial adoption.36 Thus, it is not hyperbolic to describe the support behind the 
Paris Agreement as “overwhelming,” and a historic use of international law.  
Upon reflection of the outpouring of support for the Paris Agreement, a 
fundamental question must be asked: how was the necessary momentum gained 
to support an ambitious new climate agreement? Several important factors seem 
to have led to the attitudinal shift, but most importantly, global leaders from 
countries not previously unified under the Kyoto Protocol began working 
together, and domestic investment in renewable energy has grown 
substantially.37 
In 1995, the Conference of the Parties (COP)38 —an organization created by 
the same statute that established the United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), which organized and created the Kyoto Protocol 39—began 
 
 
34 Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, supra note 2. 
35 Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Jan. 21, 
2017). 
36 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
37 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1111–13. 
38 Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2018). 
39 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties, Twenty-First Session, 
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris 
Agreement] (noting that the Conference of the Parties was created through the 1992 statute that 
established the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). See generally United 
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holding annual meetings to address the actions of global leaders.40 Since Kyoto, 
however, these meetings have not produced much new international law. This 
did not change until the December 2015 meeting in Paris (COP 21). Perhaps the 
most notable of the intermediary COPs was the 2009 meeting in Copenhagen, 
Denmark (COP 15).41 The build-up to Copenhagen led many to believe that this 
was the COP to reinvigorate the Kyoto era.42 And though Copenhagen did not 
produce a new treaty or protocol, it should not be seen as a total disappointment. 
After the fruitless official negotiating at COP 15, certain global leaders, 
including President Obama and officials from both India and China, separately 
met and reached an understanding now known as the Copenhagen Accord.43 
This conversation seemed to be the earliest indication of an official intention to 
strike mandatory target emissions from future international climate change 
solutions. From the Copenhagen Accord, the bottom-up, voluntary emission 
reduction strategy that we now see reflected in the Paris Agreement gained 
popularity.44 This change in dialogue seemed to be far more appealing to those 
states that were put off by the Kyoto Protocol’s coercive character, and it 
promised a new shift in framework for climate treaties to come. Most critically, 
the Copenhagen Accord finally did away with the distinction between Annex 1 
and non-Annex 1 countries.45 The Accord brought some of the largest polluters 
to the table, and encouraged previously uninterested countries to participate in 
climate change talks. The Copenhagen Accord also motivated developed 
countries to contribute to adaption and mitigation infrastructure in developing 
countries that needed it most.46 Though no legally binding treaties came out of 
these talks, the groundwork for Paris’s “bottom-up” voluntary participation 
strategy was laid by the Copenhagen Accord.47 
However, the rhetoric of relevant world leaders was not the only change that 
occurred between Kyoto and Paris; domestic customs also began to shift. The 
new global interest in voluntary commitments seemed to reflect the way 
sustainable development was organically impacting domestic industries. In the 
United States, a significant transition occurred between 1997 and 2015 in the 
way corporations, private citizens, and government agencies approached the 
environment.48 As climate change has continued to have global impacts, 
 
 
40 Conference Essentials, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/bare_essentials/items/6145.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).  
41 COP – COP 15, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/session/6262.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
42 Vinuales, supra note 24 (“A first attempt to address this issue [the Kyoto Protocol’s ability to only 
bind a small amount of total global emissions] was made in 2007 at the Bali COP, which launched a 
negotiation process that was supposed to lead to the adoption of a new instrument in Copenhagen, at COP 
15 (2009). This process was . . . unsuccessful in its end result . . . .”). 
43 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1111 (describing the nature and relevance of the Copenhagen Accord). 
The Copenhagen Accord and the subsequent actions by participating countries might support the principle 
of progression discussed later in this note. For discussion of the principle of progression, see Jorge 
Vinuales, The Paris Climate Agreement: An Initial Examination (Part II of III), EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 8, 
2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-climate-agreement-an-initial-examination-part-ii-of-iii/. 
44 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1111.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. (explaining that, for example, after Copenhagen, the Green Climate Fund was created and was 
promised up to $100 billion a year by 2020 for mitigation and adaption projects in developing countries). 
47 Id.  
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institutional investors have demanded transparency about climate risks on the 
business operations of the corporation.49 Local municipalities, often following 
state law initiatives began to prioritize sustainable development and reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions at local and regional levels.50 Moreover, federal 
regulations under the Obama administration have limited the amount of carbon 
pollution from power plants, cars, and trucks.51 By targeting renewable energy 
development and transportation, the United States (without participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol or any other mandated climate change obligation) reduced 
carbon emissions by fifteen percent from 2005-2012.52 Additionally, domestic 
investment in renewable energies has led the prices of renewable energy to fall 
considerably—widening the market for American businesses to realistically 
participate in sustainable development.53 In addition to the development of 
renewable energy in the United States, with help from the federal government 
domestic production of coal has decreased in favor of natural gas extraction and 
renewable energy.54 Though not a renewable energy source, natural gas has 
replaced many other dirtier forms of fossil fuels in American transportation and 
industry.55  
China, another country that was never bound by the Kyoto Protocol, and 
currently the world’s greatest emitter of greenhouse gas, has also made 
considerable improvements in its renewable energy efforts. In 2006, China 
became the world’s greatest emitter of carbon dioxide, but following the 2009 
Copenhagen Accord, China has made dramatic improvements in their energy 
sector as part of their twelfth and thirteenth Five Year Plans. Some of these 
improvements included unprecedented domestic investment in renewable 




50 Though AB 32 and the CAP method may be reminiscent of the coercive emission targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the regional application allowed California counties to choose their level of ambition and 
develop their own programs to lower their greenhouse gas emissions at the local level. These programs 
demonstrated the differences between of a “bottom-up” approach to climate change, compared to Kyoto’s 
“top-down” method. See, e.g., Local Government Actions for Climate Change, CALIFORNIA AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/localgovernment/localgovernment.htm (last reviewed 
Apr. 13, 2016) (describing the Climate Action Plans (CAPs) implemented in counties across California. 
After state law Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32) was passed, requiring each county construct plans to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions by fifteen percent, municipalities became legally obligated to find the best 
way to meet their goals locally).  
51 See Obama, supra note 4.  
52 Elizabeth Kolbert, Has Obama Fulfilled His Promise on Carbon Emissions?, NEW YORKER (June 
2, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/has-obama-fulfilled-his-promise-on-carbon-
emissions.  
53 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1112–13 (indicating that in 2014 alone the United States invested $38.3 
million in renewable energy; “as more and more emission-reducing and energy-saving policies have been 
put in place, gradual technological improvements, market competition and greater economies of scale 
have pushed down the costs of low-carbon technologies. Solar photovoltaic energy, for example, has 
become a cost-effective energy source. . . the cost of photovoltaic modules has fallen by an average rate 
of about 10 percent per year since 1980.”). 
54 Id. at 1113. 
55 See Tyler Hodge, Natural Gas Expected to Surpass Goal in Mix of Fuel Used for U.S. Power 
Generation in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25392; Dana Nuccitelli, The War on Coal is Over. 
Coal Lost., GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-
97-per-cent/2017/oct/16/the-war-on-coal-is-over-coal-lost?CMP=share_btn_fb. 
56 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1112 (noting that China invested an estimated $83.3 billion in renewable 
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renewable energies and carbon reductions resulted in a dramatic shift in China’s 
climate change culture between the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.  
Broadly speaking, domestic shifts in energy use and environmental policy 
are extremely relevant for international law as it can provide support for the 
emergence of customary international law, legitimize treaty regimes that are 
based upon consensual and voluntary participation, and rebut claims that argue 
the practice was not custom. The cultural development and domestic investment 
that has supplemented international law in the realm of climate change and 
sustainable development provides insight into why the Paris Agreement received 
such fast and enthusiastic support upon adoption. Additionally, domestic 
sustainable growth should signal the viability of the Paris Agreement’s voluntary 
character, as well as provide credibility for the Agreement’s enforcement 
mechanisms of naming and shaming.57 
 
C. THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS 
 
The consensus after the completion of the Paris Agreement was highly 
optimistic, especially because of three key features of the treaty: its aspirational 
goals, nuanced form of differentiation, and rigorous oversight.58 These key 
features contrast sharply with the Kyoto Protocol, hopefully reflecting what has 
been learned from the Kyoto Protocol’s regime—including its failure. In this 
section, this note conducts a closer examination of the Paris Agreement’s 
components, as well as the potential consequences for those who wish to 
withdraw.59 
First, the primary aspirational goal of the Paris Agreement is to halt the 
increase in global average temperature.60 The Paris Agreement states that parties 
must peak their greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and then make 
rapid reductions thereafter, “[s]o as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs [greenhouse gasses] in the 
second half of the century.”61 This goal is long term in nature, and formal 
evaluations of each nation’s progress do not begin until 2023, with check-in 
periods every five years after that.62 Because the evaluation periods are only 
every five years, beginning in 2023, the treaty has created a long-term statutory 
period. Paris’ approach thus differs sharply from the emission targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which were short-term in nature.63 Comparatively, the Paris 
Agreement’s longevity and ambitious goals show a long-term commitment by 
states to the direction of international law, and has the additional benefit of 
sending a clear signal to global markets of long-term visions for the global 
 
 
57 See Paris Agreement, supra note 39, art. 13–14 (explaining the transparency framework that 
requires parties to report their progress towards their goals and how the annual Conference of Parties will 
be the meeting in which the collective goals of the parties will be evaluated).    
58 Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative 
Possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 493–96 (2016).  
59 See infra text accompanying notes 112–57 (discussing the consequences of withdrawing from the 
Paris Agreement).  
60 Paris Agreement, supra note 39, art. 2.  
61 Rajamani, supra note 58, at 496; see also id. art. 4(1).  
62 Paris Agreement, supra note 39, art. 4(9), 14.  
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economy. Providing stability and confidence for the global economy about 
investments in green growth will hopefully aid treaty implementation and 
insulate the new legal regime.64  
Moreover, the long-term nature of the Paris Agreement has the additional 
benefit of potentially creating customary international law regarding 
international environmental norms and development. Customary international 
law, recognized to be legally binding on participating nations,65 can be shaped 
when a custom, such as a commitment to consistently reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, becomes regarded as law. Evidence of customary international law 
can include: general acceptance by the participants; adherence for a sufficient 
duration; consistent understanding of the terms and stable enforcement; and a 
finding of opinio juris––evidence that the terms are seen as law.66 If it can be 
shown throughout the Paris Agreement’s implementation that the terms, 
including participants’ commitments and implementation of goals, transitioned 
from mere statutory obligations to customary international law, then the Paris 
Agreement stands a credible chance at recognition beyond the limits of the 
treaty’s text. The architecture of the Agreement, with an aspirational goals of 
temperature reduction and evaluation periods every five years beginning in 
2023, leaves ample time for the already binding international treaty to take on 
another stable and well-recognized form—customary international law.67  
In addition to the aspirational goals of the Paris Agreement, the nuanced 
form of differentiation between nations is a feature that positions the pact for 
success. The differentiation is meant to be both inclusive and empowering to all 
participants.68 Beginning with the preamble of the Agreement, “one finds in a 
condensed manner carefully crafted expressions of the main tensions 
underpinning the entire text, between developed and developing countries, 
between more vulnerable countries and the rest, between countries that expect 
to suffer from measures that ‘respond’ to climate change and the rest . . .”69 The 
Agreement is facilitated by each state voluntarily committing to reduce its 
emissions reductions. All states are asked to commit to some amount of 
emissions reduction, but no states are assigned a mandatory reductions target, as 
they were in Kyoto. Under Paris, “[s]tates thus choose their level of ambition 
subject to two requirements, namely the regular updating––at least every five 
years . . . and an obligation of non-regression . . . .”70 The Paris Agreement’s 
voluntary contribution scheme seeks to diffuse the sharply divisive Annex 1 and 
 
 
64 Obama, supra note 4 (“[B]y sending a signal that [the Agreement] is going to be our future—a 
clean energy future—it opens up the floodgates for businesses, and scientists, and engineers to unleash 
high-tech, low-carbon investment and innovation at a scale we’ve never seen before.”).  
65 MICHAEL J. GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 1, 16 (2015). 
66 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 
20) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Cases] (establishing ways to evince creation of customary 
international law). 
67 Id.; see also GARCIA supra note 65, at 16.  
68 Vinuales, supra note 24 (“Behind this discussion [of differentiation in the Paris Agreement] lies a 
tension between science and equity.”) The tension is addressed, or was attempted to be addressed, by 
including the aspirational goals alongside a discussion of differentiation. 
69 Id. 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 133–136; see also Vinuales, supra note 43 (citing Paris 
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non-Annex 1 strategy of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as reduce the coercive effect 
of mandatorily assigned targets. The Annex strategy not only excluded many 
developing countries, chief of which included high carbon emitters like China 
and India, but also disheartened developed countries that felt that even a good 
faith attempt at meeting their target emissions would make only a marginal 
impact on overall climate change efforts.71 Additionally, the distinction between 
Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 under the Kyoto Protocol restricted the ability or 
motivation of developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, as 
they were not required to participate.72  
Now, developing countries like China or India cannot shirk participation 
merely because of their developing status.73 The Paris Agreement reflects the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, but implements this 
international law doctrine more effectively. Though all participating nations 
must voluntarily assume and be accountable for their emission reduction goals, 
accommodations for developing countries are also included. To offset the cost 
on now-included developing countries, the Paris Agreement incorporates 
adaptation by developing countries as a goal, and urges developed countries to 
provide developing states with financial and logistical support. Including 
mechanisms to support adaptation is a new way to address climate change, 
responsive to the reality that, as Vinuales writes, “[i]t may be that climate change 
is no longer a matter of precaution but one of prevention – preventing 
acknowledged risk.”74 Creating infrastructure and advancing technology in 
developing nations, via funding from developed nations, recognizes the different 
capacities of different countries, reflects the common but differentiated 
responsibilities doctrine, and focuses on adaptation. However, the Agreement 
still expects developing nations to contribute throughout the adaptation process.  
The third promising feature of the Paris Agreement is the innovative 
approach to oversight and enforcement. Compared to the Kyoto Protocol’s 
mandatory and legally-binding emissions reductions, the Paris Agreement takes 
a less coercive, information-based approach.75 Through the construction of 
international law, the Paris Agreement hopes to use both official and unofficial 
sources of pressure in its information-based enforcement. As Falkner writes, the 
Paris Agreement relies on a “two-level game” logic that unites domestic climate 
politics with strategic international interaction.76 Though the Paris Agreement 
does not impute a legal obligation for states to actually reduce their emissions 
per their commitments, it does require periodic reports to be disclosed to the 
participants of the Agreement. These reports will occur every five years, 
beginning in 2023, and will provide the international community with a 
transparent look into the efforts of other states to combat climate change.77 The 
information garnered from these periodic reports, and their subsequent review, 
 
 
71 Durand, supra note 10, at 8–9.  
72 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1116.  
73 Id.  
74 Vinuales, supra note 24.  
75 Jorge Vinuales, The Paris Climate Agreement: An Initial Examination (Part III of III) EJIL: TALK! 
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-climate-agreement-an-initial-examination-part-iii-of-
iii/. 
76 Falkner, supra note 1, at 1120.  








118 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 8:2 
 
may facilitate the “naming and shaming” of states that have not succeeded in 
meeting their goals.78 The peer pressure function should work effectively 
between nations, as they may easily identify and call out those that have failed 
to make a good faith effort to meet their voluntary contributions. The mandatory 
reporting serves to make the Agreement transparent and legitimate to the 
international community.79  
The naming and shaming also anticipates pressure on the contributing 
parties from civil society, as governments of underperforming countries may 
experience naming and shaming by environmental groups, the media, and other 
interested parties.80 Domestically, after nations choose their emission reduction 
contribution, they will likely face some pressure from groups in their country 
regarding their performance under the contribution. Internationally, the 
Agreement is also designed to create peer pressure among states, which could 
be exerted on states that are failing to meet their commitments. The naming and 
shaming function between states delivers the brunt of the Agreement’s 
enforcement mechanism. Though the enforcement tools of the Paris Agreement 
do not create actual legal liability for states that neglect their commitments, the 
enforcement strategies should not be seen as toothless.81 By operating with 
multiple kinds of enforcement, and engaging with both domestic and 
international paradigms over a long period of time, the Paris Agreement 
consciously increases the likelihood of immediate enforcement and of 
transitioning from mere statute to binding customary international law.82  
 
 
II. LEGALITY OF THE UNITED STATES’ COMMITMENT TO AND POTENTIAL 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT  
 
A. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 2016 COMMITMENT TO THE TREATY 
 
When President Obama ratified the Paris Agreement in September 2016, he 
did not have the support of the Senate. Under Article II of the Constitution, the 
President of the United States must secure the advice and consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate before entering into treaties.83 However, in part due to the limited 
 
 
78 Vinuales, supra note 75.  
79 Id.  
80 It should be noted, however, that any civil society pressure is, logically, completely dependent on 
the domestic media or other monitoring groups being interested in the national climate change policies. 
The political systems, prevalence of environmental groups, and level of partisan politics can all 
substantially contribute to the level of “naming and shaming” experienced domestically. See Falkner, 
supra note 1, at 1122–23.  
81 Id. at 1123. For additional enforcement potential beyond domestic and international oversight 
mechanisms, Falkner notes that global economic forces will also be an effective mechanism to judge and 
enforce decarbonization progress under the Paris Agreement. The effect of the Agreement, and reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions, on the global economy, if done at such a scale to trigger a shift in resource 
use globally, may motivate and exert pressure upon participating countries to legitimately meet their 
emissions reductions goals.  
82 Vinuales, supra note 75.  
83 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also GARCIA, supra note 65, at 2 (“Under U.S. law, a treaty is an 
agreement negotiated and signed by the Executive that enters into force if it is approved by a two-thirds 
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constitutional guidance on treaties, Supreme Court case law and domestic 
practice have developed to recognize the executive’s ability to conduct foreign 
affairs through executive agreements.84 Entering into executive agreements is an 
alternative to forming treaties, allowing the executive to make international 
commitments without ever submitting the proposal to the Senate for its advice 
and consent.85 The Supreme Court held in American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi that “the president has the authority to make ‘executive agreements’ 
with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by 
Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the 
Republic.”86 This form of international law-making has been far more heavily 
used than formal treaties—likely because of the difficulty of reaching the 
required two-third’s consent in the Senate.87 Executive agreements in the context 
of international legal agreements, made by the President, are authorized if they 
are based on existing legal authority, including prior grants of power from 
Congress to the executive or the President’s inherent constitutional control over 
foreign affairs.88 Assuming the executive agreement is supported by the 
Constitution and falls within the scope of the President’s foreign affairs power, 
Congress’s approval or disapproval does not impact the agreement’s validity.89 
In choosing to join the Paris Agreement, President Obama faced the “recurring 
concern . . . whether an international commitment should be entered into as a 
treaty or an executive agreement.”90 Logically, legislative bodies tend to prefer 
the forms of international agreements that maximize their participation. It then 
follows that “[t]he Senate may prefer that significant international commitments 
be entered as treaties . . . [due to] fear that reliance on executive agreements will 
lead to an erosion of the treaty power.”91 The House of Representatives may 
 
 
84 There certainly is opposition, or at least concern, about the role the federal government has in 
foreign affairs. See, e.g., Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 93, 96 (2014) 
(“[C]ourts should enforce constitutional limits on the President’s power to make treaties and Congress’s 
power to implement treaties by preventing either from infringing on the sovereignty reserved to the states. 
Whether one couches this as a Tenth Amendment or a structural argument, the basic point is the people, 
acting in their sovereign capacity, delegated only limited powers to the federal government while 
reserving the remaining sovereign powers to the states or individuals. If the federal government could 
evade the limits on its powers by making or implementing treaties, then our system of dual sovereignty 
would be grievously undermined.”).  
85 GARCIA, supra note 65, at 4 (explaining that, although executive agreements have been used since 
the Founding, they “have been employed much more frequently since the World War II era.”).  
86 Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (citations omitted). For further discussion, 
see BODANSKY, supra note 4, at 5 (indicating that the constitutional basis for executive agreements is 
discussed and distilled to three main sources of support. “First, Article I, Section 10, implies that not all 
international agreements constitute ‘treaties,’ since states are precluded from entering into ‘treaties’ with 
other countries, but are allowed to enter into ‘agreements’. . . . Second, Article II does not state that its 
treaty-making procedure is exclusive. Third, the extensive powers granted by the Constitution to Congress 
and the president provide bases for agreement-making.”).  
87 GARCIA, supra note 65, at 5 (“[O]ver 18,500 executive agreements have been concluded by the 
United States since 1789. . . compared to roughly 1,100 treaties that have been ratified by the United 
States.”).  
88 Id. at 6. “[N]o one denies that the president has the power to make some agreements on his own 
authority.” BODANSKY, supra note 4, at 7 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 215 (1996)). 
89 GARCIA, supra note 65, at 6 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 303(4) 
(1987)).  
90 Id. at 7. 
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instead prefer congressional-executive actions, which would involve the 
president entering an agreement with the direction or consent of both houses of 
Congress.92 
In the case of a constitutional challenge to a President’s use of a unilateral 
executive agreement, the Court may need to examine the legitimacy of the 
President’s actions within the structurally defined foreign affairs power of the 
executive.93 The Court’s analysis in the famous case Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer offers a potential check on the President’s ability to make 
executive agreements without any support or authority from Congress. The 
Court held that “when the president takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .”94 
Instead of joining the Paris Agreement by obtaining Senate’s approval or 
through an act of Congress, President Obama ratified the Paris Agreement with 
an executive agreement—a vulnerable method for the United States to join the 
treaty, thus making it easier for a subsequent president to withdraw from it.95 
However, there was much precedent for a United States President to join an 
environmental agreement through an executive action, without the support or 
inclusion of Congress.96 As a report from the Center for Climate and Energy 
Solutions explained, “the United States entered into the 1991 Air Quality 
Agreement (AQA) with Canada, without any action by the Senate or Congress . 
. . . Similarly, the United States entered into several protocols under the 1979 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP) as presidental-
executive agreements, including the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to Abate 
Acidification.”97 The Center’s report further described three constitutional bases 
that could support President Obama’s ratification of the Paris Agreement as 
either a unilaterally executive action, congressional-executive agreement, or a 
treaty-executive agreement: 
First, the president’s core foreign affairs powers include 
communicating with foreign governments. To the extent that 
the Paris agreement . . . relat[es] to reporting and review, then 
it would arguably fall within the president’s independent 
constitutional authority.  
 
 
92 Id. For further discussion of congressional-executive agreements, see BODANSKY, supra note 4, at 
5–6.  
93 GARCIA, supra note 65, at 6 
94 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647 (1952). 
95 Though, as will be discussed later in more detail, if President Trump decides to withdraw from the 
UNFCCC entirely, and not just the Paris Agreement, the inquiry will be slightly different because the 
UNFCCC was created by a Senate-approved treaty. See U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & 
NATURAL RESOURCES (Dec. 6, 2005), https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-
news?ID=E5CEC797-F583-4FAC-9F80-27CECB779718 (providing a copy of a bipartisan letter was 
sent to President Bush urging his administration to engage conversations on climate change and 
reminding him that the United States has entered into the treaty that created the UNFCCC).  
96 However, environmental treaties with mandatory provisions joined without Congress’ participation 
may again raise constitutional questions for those who believe that the President’s treaty power is 
structurally limited. See Cruz, supra note 84, at 105. 
97 BODANSKY, supra note 4, at 14 (footnote omitted) (explaining that the 1991 Air Quality Agreement 
was joined by the President “on the basis that the commitments contained in the agreement tracked the 
requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Amendments. Similarly, the United States entered into several [other] 
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Second, an international agreement addressing climate 
change would complement existing law. . . . 
 
Finally, an agreement that solely implemented or 
elaborated the UNFCCC’s existing commitments would 
arguably be within the scope of the Senate’s original advice 
and consent to the convention, and therefore would constitute 
a treaty-executive agreement.98 
 
The report goes on to write that the legal basis for President Obama’s 
signing of the Paris Agreement is further bolstered by the inclusion of a 
withdrawal clause, “which would expressly permit a future president to 
terminate the United States’ international obligations under the agreement.”99 A 
withdrawal clause would limit the binding nature of the Paris Agreement, and 
would be less offensive to those concerned that unilateral executive agreements 
verged on unconstitutionality.100 Moreover, the less legally binding language is 
in the Paris Agreement, the more legitimate the participation of the United States 
becomes. As we know, the ultimate strategy of Paris was not to require 
substantive emissions reductions, but to require procedural participation of 
domestic efforts through periodic reporting and review. In conclusion, though 
President Obama signed the Paris Agreement without going through either 
legislative body, his ratification met constitutional muster. And, as the United 
States is a full participatory member in the treaty, the ratification included the 
whole text of the Paris Agreement. 
As the methods by which the United States’ ratification of the Paris 
Agreement appear to be constitutionally valid, the terms of the Paris Agreement 
should fully apply to the United States. However, there may have been further 
legal obligations incurred by joining the treaty due to customary international 
law. Customary international law, as briefly discussed above,101 is a significant 
way that international law grows and evolves. Participation for a critical duration 
in an international custom, and widespread recognition that the custom has 
gained the status of law (otherwise described as opinio juris), is sufficient to 
establish that the custom has become legally binding and enforceable 
international law.102 Though customary international law is certainly recognized 
in foreign courts,103 the full effects of customary international law upon the 




98 Id. (first citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S 497, 528–33 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court held 
that the Clean Air Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency . . . to find that carbon dioxide is 
a pollutant and to regulate it as such. Since the threat posed by carbon dioxide emissions requires 
international action, the president could argue that the authority to negotiate an international agreement 
is a necessary adjunct to the regulation of domestic emissions.”); then citing UNFCCC, supra note 39, 
art. 16).  
99 Id. 
100 See id.  
101 See supra text accompanying notes 65–67. 
102 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 66.  
103 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 66. 
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B. PRESIDENT TRUMP WITHDRAWS 
 
On June 1, 2017, President Trump announced that he would withdraw the 
United States from the Paris Agreement. In the official statement he said,  
 
[W]e’re getting out. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
. . . the United States will cease all implementation of the 
non-binding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and 
economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country. This 
includes ending the implementation of the nationally 
determined contribution and, very importantly, the Green 
Climate Fund which is costing the United States a vast 
fortune.105 
 
Then, on August 4, 2017, the Trump Administration provided further detail 
on the current state of U.S. involvement in the Paris Agreement.106 The 
administration reiterated intent for the United States to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement—joining Syria and Nicaragua as the only nations not party to the 
Agreement.107 Additionally, the administration shared that they had formally 
sent in paperwork to the United Nations to withdraw, but that they intended to 
maintain a “seat at the table” in UNFCC and climate change developments going 
forward.108  
Perhaps affirming the United States’ intention to stay involved mitigates the 
frustration that the United States is technically bound by the withdrawal terms 
of the Paris Agreement. Procedurally, under Article 28 of the Agreement, the 
earliest that the United States could officially withdraw would be three years 
after the Agreement went into force. As the Agreement went into force 
November 4, 2016, the earliest the United States could officially withdraw 
would be November 4, 2019,109 and the withdrawal would not go into effect for 
another year, November 4, 2020.110 Conveniently, November 4, 2020 is just one 
day after the next U.S. presidential election. The schedule of withdrawal and 
date of the next presidential election creates, should President Trump fail to be 
re-elected, the possibility that the United States may never leave the Paris 
Agreement. However, under the current trajectory of American leadership, 
 
 
105 President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 
2017) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-
president-trump-paris-climate-accord).  
106 Robinson Meyer, Trump and the Paris Agreement: What Just Happened?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/08/trump-and-the-paris-agreement-what-just-
happened/536040/.  
107 Laura Koran, US Notifies UN of Intent to Pull Out of Climate Deal, CNN (Aug. 4, 2017), 
http://cnn.it/2hvSGOQ.  
108 Id.  
109 Paris Agreement, supra note 39, art. 28(1).  
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President Trump’s announcement raises questions about the legal limitations 
and ramifications of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. 
 
C. LEGALITY OF WITHDRAWAL 
 
Though the United States’ joining of the agreement appears to be fully valid, 
the true question is what a Trump withdrawal means—both for the Paris 
Agreement and the United States. What commitments is the United States 
backing out of? What enforcement mechanisms in the Paris Agreement, if any, 
apply? The constitutionally granted foreign affairs power of the executive 
branch almost conclusively gives President Trump the power to withdraw from 
a treaty under U.S. law.111 However, in analyzing the legality of withdrawing 
from the Paris Agreement, there is the primary concern of whether to analyze 
the events under international law or only U.S. domestic law.112 These two 
regimes appear to conflict with one another regarding withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, and as such, analysis under each may lead to a different result.  
Under U.S. domestic law, the nature of the treaty will affect its legal status 
and protection. As a congressional report on the role of international law in 
American jurisprudence states:  
 
The status of an international agreement within the 
United States depends on a variety of factors. Self-executing 
treaties have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. 
state law, and inferior to the Constitution. Depending upon the 
nature of executive agreements, they may or may not have a 
status equal to federal statute. In any case, self-executing 
executive agreements have a status that is superior to U.S. 
state law and inferior to the Constitution. Treaties or executive 
agreements that are not self-executing generally have been 
understood by the courts to have limited status domestically; 
rather, the legislation or regulations implementing these 
agreements are controlling.113  
 
As the Paris Agreement is recognized to be a non-self-executing treaty,114 
proponents of the treaty seem to have an even further diminished capacity to 
argue against a Trump repeal. Thus, the Paris Agreement constitutes a non-self-
executing statute because it requires domestic legislation to achieve any true 
 
 
111 Can the President Withdraw from the Paris Agreement?, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS: CRS LEGAL 
SIDEBAR (Dec. 5, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/withdraw.pdf.  
112 Id. 
113 GARCIA, supra note 65. 
114 See Can the President Withdraw from the Paris Agreement?, supra note 111 (“No legislation 
implementing the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement into domestic law has been enacted, nor has the 
executive branch asserted that the provisions in either are self-executing, a term used to describe 
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effect, and does not stretch the executive’s foreign affairs power to the same 
degree as a self-executing treaty might. 115 
However, under international law, treaties are primarily governed, or at the 
very least guided, by the Vienna Convention on Treaties, and customary 
international law.116 The Vienna Convention creates a set of default rules for the 
navigation of treaties, including what constitutes full participation and 
performance under treaties, what constitutes a failure to perform or breach, and 
how, if at all, a party may lawfully withdraw from a treaty. These rules may be 
amended or narrowed by the specific text of a new treaty, but the Vienna 
Convention provides a default procedure in the case that the treaty neglected to 
specify their own terms.117 It is a principle of treaty interpretation under the 
Vienna Convention to first defer to a plain reading of the treaty’s text when 
analyzing a particular section, and the Paris Agreement is no exception.118 This 
is the approach to take when analyzing the carefully worded withdrawal clause 
of the Paris Agreement, the clause President Trump is expected to invoke 
without much delay.  
Article 28 of the Paris Agreement provides that  
 
1. At any time after three years from the date on which this 
Agreement has entered into force for a Party, that Party may 
withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification 
. . . .  
 
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of 
one year from the date of receipt . . . of the notification of 
withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the 
notification of withdrawal.119  
 
Importantly, however, Article 28(3), states that “[a]ny Party that withdraws 
from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this 
 
 
115 A self-executing treaty would effectively create domestic law, as, for example, the Kyoto Protocol 
made emissions reductions legally binding on the participating countries without the need for additional 
domestic law to establish that legal liability. If the executive signs on to a self-executing treaty without 
following Article II’s treaty process, then the executive has essentially legislated in lieu of the legislature. 
Under a structural argument or Tenth Amendment argument, this would be objectionable. See Cruz, supra 
note 84, at 93 (“[T]reaties ‘constitute international law commitments,’ but they ‘do not by themselves 
function as binding federal law’—these are called non-self-executing treaties.” (quoting Medellín v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008))); Cruz, supra note 84, at 94–95 (“[Medellín] recognized critical limits 
on the federal government’s power to use a non-self-executing treaty to supersede state law. . . . The court 
held that state procedural default rules could not be displaced by the non-self-executing Vienna 
Convention . . . . And it then clarified that the President cannot use a non-self-executing treaty ‘to 
unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic courts.’ . . . But Medellín involved an unusual 
fact pattern and many questions remain about the scope of the federal government’s treaty power.” 
(quoting Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527)). 
116 BODANSKY, supra note 4, at 3 (“The international law is codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which generally reflects customary international law.”); see Vienna Convention, 
supra note 102; see also GARCIA, supra note 65 (“International law is derived from two primary 
sources—international agreements and customary practice.”).  
117 See Vienna Convention, supra note 102.  
118 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶114, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
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Agreement.”120 The “Convention” referred to in this final section is the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the international body 
spearheading all major global environmental efforts. The United States is a 
member to the Convention, and has been since joining the Framework treaty in 
1992.121  
President Trump thus has two lawful options to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement, under international law. First, he can withdraw the United States 
just from the Paris Agreement, a process which will take four years to become 
official due to the wait period built into the treaty.122 The earliest any party could 
lawfully withdraw from the Agreement, is November 4, 2020. However, that 
would assume the party had submitted their intention to withdraw on the very 
day the treaty was ratified. Secondly, he could withdraw from the UNFCC, and 
remove the United States’ “seat at the table” for all current and future 
international environmental developments.123  
Domestic law over treaties and foreign affairs, which tends to be less 
restrictive on executive action by the United States, is sourced from Article II of 
the Constitution and respective case law.124 The United States, however, also has 
a long tradition of holding international law, or “the law of nations,” as binding 
on domestic affairs.125 Thus, while President Trump may have the domestic legal 
means to withdraw from global climate change agreements, pillars of 
international law may potentially bind him. As previously discussed, 
international law is primarily made of treaties and customary international law. 
The United States does recognize customary international law, in addition to 
treaties, as part of the national jurisprudence. In The Paquete Habana, the 
Supreme Court held that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,” meaning that 
the law of nations was also part of the laws of the United States.126 
Constitutionally, the laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land.127 
Additionally, according to the United States Department of State’s website, the 
Department recognizes that the United States is not party to the Vienna 
Convention, and stated that “[t]he United States considers many of the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute 
customary international law on the law of treaties.”128 Though the Department 
policy is not dispositive that all customary international law is incorporated 
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under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, it supports the theory that 
customary international law, when appropriately established through U.S. 
participation and practice, can become the supreme, legally binding law of the 
land. “The effects of . . . customary international practice, upon the United States 
are more ambiguous and controversial. While there is some Supreme Court 
jurisprudence finding that customary international law is part of U.S. law, U.S. 
statutes that conflict with customary rules remain controlling.”129 Commitments 
made under the Paris Agreement, if found to be enforceable under emerging 
customary international law, may be incorporated into law in the United States 
under the “law of nations.” However, the doctrine of last in time—which states 
that when statutes (including treaties) conflict and are irreconcilable, American 
courts must find the most recent law controlling—weakens the role of customary 
international law.130 Applying the last in time doctrine, any customary 
international law that may support the Paris Agreement is vulnerable if a new 
law is passed that irreconcilably contradicts it.  
Under international law, if there is customary international law enforcing 
the provisions of the Paris Agreement, as well as those under the UNFCC, then 
there may be some reason to believe that the United States has an obligation to 
remain a party to them. The most fully articulated concept of the customary law 
regime regarding environmental treaties is known as the principle of 
progression. This concept holds that once a nation has made a commitment to 
improve their response to climate change, they cannot later return to the prior, 
lesser, levels of commitment. This doctrine, as a relatively new development in 
customary international law, finds its source in the Paris Agreement’s obligation 
of non-regression.131 In Article 4, the Paris Agreement reads, “Each Party’s 
successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression 
beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution . . . .”132 The 
inclusion of a Party’s obligation to commit more than they have in the past is 
“new and signals what perhaps will become a major new principle of 
international environmental law.”133 As European Commissioner for Climate 
Change Miguel Arias Canete stated, “The fight against climate change cannot 
depend on the result of elections in one country of [sic] another. When a country 
signs an international agreement it has to fulfil its commitments.”134 Thus, while 
domestic law may freely empower the President to withdraw from treaties at 
will, under international law the President may be legally obligated to remain 
part of international environmental agreements. Herein exists the conflict 
between the ability of the United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement 
or UNFCCC under domestic versus international law. 
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Aside from domestic and international law principles, the Paris treaty itself 
creates some repercussions for a noncompliant or exiting party. The chief 
enforcement mechanism of the Paris Agreement, and one of its main innovations 
is the “‘enhanced transparency framework for action and support’ established by 
Article 13” of the Agreement.135 The transparency mandated by the statute 
allows the global community to fully understand the level of progress other 
countries are making toward their committed contributions. With this 
information, states may “name and shame,” as a form of public pressure, when 
their peers are neglecting to take action.136 Though it is aimed at enforcing the 
terms of the treaty for participating countries—not punishing those who leave—
the kind of consequences one would expect from a negligent participant will 
likely be felt many times over by a nation who leaves.  
The naming and shaming pressure formalized by the Paris Agreement has 
already been utilized since President Trump announced he will withdraw the 
United States from the treaty. Even before he was inaugurated, world leaders 
expressed concern about Trump’s intention to withdraw at the 2016 COP in 
Morocco.137 But that was just the beginning of the explicit naming and shaming 
Trump has received for his position of climate change and Paris. Since his 
official withdrawal, President Trump has been named and shamed both 
internationally and domestically. 
Internationally, a chorus of world leaders immediately condemned President 
Trump’s decision to leave Paris in June 2017. French President, Emmanuel 
Macron, responded to Trump’s withdrawal saying that Trump’s decision not to 
honor the Agreement was a mistake, and “made a plea for entrepreneurs, 
scientists, and engineers who want to work on climate issues to leave the United 
States and move to France.”138 Macron was not the only leader shaming Trump 
to “make our planet great again.”139 Canadian Prime Minster, Justin Trudeau, 
stated that, “[Canadians] are deeply disappointed that the United States federal 
government has decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.”140 Miguel 
Arias Cañete, European Union Climate Action and Energy Commissioner, 
stated: 
 
Today is a sad day for the global community, as a key 
partner turns its back on the fight against climate change. The 
EU deeply regrets the unilateral decision by the Trump 
administration to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. 
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. . . .  
 
. . . Europe and its strong partners all around the world are 
ready to lead the way. . . .  
 
. . . We are on the right side of history.141  
 
Further, world leaders from France, Canada, and Mexico have warned they 
are open to imposing a carbon tax on the United States, should the United States 
withdraw from the treaty.142 Other leaders warn that withdrawing from the Paris 
Agreement could have serious diplomatic implications for the United States.143 
The heat President Trump has felt, and will continue to feel, for leaving the 
Agreement will be intense, given the outcry he has already received in his short 
time as President. The global temperament surrounding President Trump seems 
to be increasingly unforgiving. Specifically, world leaders reacted to President 
Trump’s executive order that bans immigrants and refugees from seven 
predominantly Muslim countries, by calling it illegal, divisive, insulting, and 
discriminatory.144 In this political environment, it seems that withdrawing from 
a celebrated and nearly-unanimously supported environmental treaty (or entire 
treaty framework, if he were to withdraw from the UNFCC) will not be taken 
lightly by the international community.  
Instead, it likely will continue to be met with harsh criticism, diplomatic 
repercussions, and even potential economic sanctions. Already, diplomatic 
relations have soured. “The [July 2017] G20 meeting saw a number of tense 
encounters between Trump and other world leaders, with a particular clash 
between him and the French delegation over climate change . . . .”145 While every 
other member of the G20 signed a declaration that the Paris Agreement was 
irreversible, President Trump stood alone in opposition.146 Exclusion from 
international relationships and cooperation seems to be a very a functional 
consequence of withdrawing. Already, the European Council is strengthening its 
partnership with China to combat climate change and build a EU-Chino bond.147 
The Paris Agreement’s overwhelming support seems to have created a 
diplomatic divide between the United States (and Nicaragua and Syria) and the 
rest of the world that remains committed to the treaty. 
Domestically, Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement has sparked outrage. Industry leaders such as Facebook, General 
Electric, Apple, Ford, and Microsoft have all doubled down on their support of 
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the Agreement and pledged their private sector commitment to follow the goals 
of the Treaty.148 Cities and counties across the United States have declared they 
too will “remain” in the Paris Agreement.149 Notably, after President Trump’s 
withdrawal speech in June 2017 where he declared that he was leaving the treaty 
because he was elected to represent the people of Pittsburgh not Paris, Pittsburgh 
mayor Bill Peduto responded that “Pittsburgh stands with the world and will 
follow Paris agreement. As the mayor of Pittsburgh, I can assure you that we 
will follow the guidelines of the Paris agreement for our people, our economy 
and future.”150 Moreover, individual states, Native American tribes, and 
universities have also joined the movement against the President’s 
withdrawal.151 
None of this naming and shaming would matter, however, if the Trump 
administration did not plan on building diplomatic relationships, conducting 
friendly foreign affairs, working with American industry, and counting on state 
and local agency cooperation at home. But it appears the administration does 
plan to pursue international deals as part of its foreign policy and economic 
agenda. Common sense dictates international political capital should be a 
priority, but withdrawing from Paris does not reflect such prudence.152 After 
withdrawing from the Trans Pacific Partnership, which Trump stated was a bad 
deal for the United States, the President has also stated he is interested in forming 
bilateral trade agreements with countries such as Japan.153 Though these bilateral 
trade deals seem to be a priority for President Trump, if he creates a reputation 
for the United States as a fair-weather diplomatic partner who will leave treaties 
and devastate the purposes of international conventions, it may be challenging 
to build trust during future agreements. Thus, the consequences for the United 
States of leaving the Paris Agreement may range from naming and shaming 
pressure to loss of diplomatic goodwill, or even to economic sanctions that could 
provoke a trade war.154 At home, Trump explicitly has expressed interest in 
working with American businesses.155 Also, he has specifically designed policy 
that requires support, cooperation, and communication with state, regional, and 
local agencies.156 But backlash over his decision to withdraw from Paris may 
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deplete the political capital he needs to work effectively with domestic 






The Paris Agreement, regardless of continued U.S. involvement, is a 
revolutionary document. It represents not only a new way of using international 
law to address global environmental challenges but showed just how united the 
world can be in addressing them. The trajectory of the Paris Agreement was 
undeniably changed by President Trump’s withdrawal of U.S. involvement, but 




157 Already, President Trump’s domestic policies have angered American cities like Chicago to the 
point of declaring their city a “Trump Free Zone.” Pursuing the withdrawal from Paris Agreement seems 
likely to only aggravate these tensions. See, e.g., Melissa Etehad, Mayor Rahm Emanuel Declares 
Chicago a ‘Trump Free Zone’ after DACA Decision, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-dreamers-decision-live-updates-mayor-rahm-emanuel-declares-
chicago-1504638077-htmlstory.html.  
